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INTRODUCTION 
Oil is black gold1––where there is oil, there is money to be 
made. Louisiana holds close to 10% of the nation’s oil reserves, 
and its reserves of other minerals, such as natural gas, are even 
more significant.2 Not surprisingly, the ownership of mineral rights 
is frequently litigated in Louisiana, often involving family 
members at war, fighting for the right to claim lucrative mineral 
rights.3 To avoid family turmoil, a mineral rights owner may 
choose to prepare a last will and testament to ensure that, upon his 
death, the rights are given to the intended beneficiary. Although 
deference to a testator’s intent is a fundamental principle of 
Louisiana succession law,4 recent jurisprudence interpreting the 
inception and classification of the surviving spouse usufruct and 
how it applies to Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 has produced 
uncertainty as to whether Louisiana courts will actually uphold a 
testator’s final wish.5 
Imagine a testator who creates a last will and testament 
bequeathing everything he owns to his spouse. Included in the 
testator’s estate is a piece of immovable property located in 
Louisiana that is rich with oil, which could provide for his family for 
years to come. Unbeknownst to the testator, Louisiana recognizes a 
doctrine called forced heirship, which reserves for the testator’s 
children a portion of his estate called the forced portion.6 As forced 
heirs, his children have the right to demand their share of his estate 
even though the testator bequeathed all of his property to his 
spouse.7 The children successfully move to have the testator’s 
bequest to the spouse judicially reduced in order to satisfy their 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by ALEXANDER BAYNHAM. 
 1. Black Gold, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/black%20gold, archived at http://perma.cc/7SL6-6YB9 (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2014). See also Michael A. Ogline, Black Gold: An Oil and Gas Primer 
for Estate Planners, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 31 (2009). 
 2. “Louisiana contains just under 10 percent of all known U.S. oil reserves 
and is the country’s third largest producer of petroleum. Its reserves of natural gas 
are even larger and it produces just over one-quarter of all U.S. supplies.” 
INFOLOUISIANA, http://doa.louisiana.gov/about_economy.htm, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/AT6V-ZTAU (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). 
 3. See Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012); Darby v. Rozas, 580 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 4. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015); Succession of Mydland, 653 So. 2d 
8, 11–12 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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forced portion.8 As a result, the testator’s children are recognized 
as the naked owners of the Louisiana property,9 leaving his spouse 
with only a usufruct over that property10––even though the testator 
wished to give all of his property to his spouse.  
A few years later, oil operations begin on the Louisiana property 
and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in royalties. Both the 
testator’s spouse and his children believe that they are entitled to the 
proceeds, the spouse as usufructuary and the children as naked 
owners of the land. A lawsuit is filed to determine who is legally 
entitled to the mineral rights. Unfortunately for the spouse, the court 
relies on a recent Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision, 
which leads the court to make two erroneous determinations as to 
the inception and classification of the usufruct.11  
First, the court holds that the spouse’s usufruct was created 
when the trial court granted a judgment of possession, which is the 
stage in succession proceedings recognizing the relationship of the 
parties to the decedent.12 Further, the court finds that the judgment 
of possession occurred prior to the commencement of the oil 
production on the property. This analysis is problematic, however, 
because Louisiana law is clear that a judgment of possession does 
not create rights––it merely recognizes inheritance rights already 
conferred by operation of law.13 This incorrect finding as to when 
                                                                                                             
 8. Reduction is the right of forced heirs to reduce excessive donations to 
the extent necessary to eliminate impingements on the portion that they are 
guaranteed. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 9. “The naked owner enjoys prerogatives of ownership to the extent that 
they do not interfere with the enjoyment of the usufructuary. Accordingly, during 
the existence of the usufruct, the rights of the naked owner begin where the rights 
of the usufructuary end.” A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 5:3, in 
3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 341 (5th ed. 2011). The naked owner may also 
“dispose of the naked ownership, but he cannot thereby affect the usufruct.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 603 (2015). 
 10. A usufruct is a “real right of limited duration on the property of 
another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 535 (2015). A usufructuary is entitled to the usus 
and the fructus over the property, but the usufructuary is not entitled to the 
abusus. Generally, this means that a usufructuary is only entitled to use and 
enjoy the fruits of the property but has no power to alienate the thing. See 
discussion infra Part I.A. 
 11. See infra Part II; Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 
3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 12. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2012). 
 13. Id. (“The judgment of possession rendered in a succession proceeding 
shall be prima facie evidence of the relationship to the deceased of the parties 
recognized therein, as heir, legatee, surviving spouse in community, or 
usufructuary, as the case may be, and of their right to the possession of the estate 
of the deceased.”); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., The Chaos and Confusion of Modern 
Collation: A Critical Look into an Institution of Louisiana Successions Law, 75 
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the usufruct was created may have serious implications if the 
“open mine” doctrine is invoked to determine who is entitled to the 
mineral rights, as that doctrine states that a usufructuary is only 
entitled to the rights in mines that were “actually worked at the 
time the usufruct was created.”14 
Second, the court fails to recognize the scholarly debate over 
the true type of usufruct that arises when a decedent leaves his 
entire estate to his spouse and the forced heirs exercise their right 
of reduction. As a result, the court holds that the spouse’s usufruct 
does not qualify as a “surviving spouse” usufruct under Louisiana 
Mineral Code article 190, an article providing special rules that 
govern usufructs of mineral rights.15 Article 190 contains two 
sections with different rules that determine whether the naked 
owner or the usufructuary is entitled to the mineral rights: section 
A for usufructs other than those of a surviving spouse and section 
B for usufructs of a surviving spouse.16 
Because the court finds that the spouse is not a “surviving 
spouse” under article 190, the court applies the section that 
subjects the spouse to the “open mine” doctrine instead of the 
section that grants mineral rights to the surviving spouse—
regardless of whether the mine was open at the time the usufruct 
was created.17 However, the court builds upon its prior 
determination that the judgment of possession created the usufruct 
instead of relying on Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence, which 
show that a spouse who is living when the decedent dies is not 
simply a legatee of the testator’s will but is also a “surviving 
spouse.”18 
                                                                                                             
 
TUL. L. REV. 411, 434 (2000) (“In a judgment of possession, an heir ‘acquires 
nothing . . . that was not already his by operation of law.’” (citation omitted)). 
 14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The open 
mine doctrine is defined under Mineral Code article 191:  
[I]f at the time a usufruct is created minerals are being produced from 
the land or other land unitized therewith, or if there is present on the 
land or other land unitized therewith, a well shown by surface 
production test to be capable of producing in paying quantities, the 
usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner’s 
rights in minerals as to all pools penetrated by the well or wells in 
question. 
Id. § 31:191(A).  
 15. Id. § 31:190. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989); Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 
1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
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As a result of the court’s conclusions that the usufruct was 
created at the time the judgment of possession was rendered and 
that the open mine doctrine applies to the spouse, the testator’s 
spouse is not entitled to receive any of the mineral proceeds. 
Because the judgment of possession was rendered before mineral 
production began, there was not an open mine at the time of the 
usufruct’s creation; thus, the testator’s children are entitled to the 
proceeds as the naked owners of the property. The court’s flawed 
analysis stems from its reliance on a Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeal decision that misinterpreted the law of usufruct in the 
context of mineral rights, which leads to an outcome completely 
contrary to not only Louisiana law but also the decedent’s intent. 
This is exactly the troubling outcome that could occur as a 
result of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s faulty 
reasoning in Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil.19 In Quantum, 
the court held that the judgment of possession rendered in the 
succession proceedings created the spouse’s usufruct.20 Further, 
the court found that the decedent’s spouse was merely a legatee of 
the decedent’s will. Even though he was, in fact, a surviving 
spouse, the court held that he was not a surviving spouse under 
Mineral Code article 190.21 Thus, the court applied Mineral Code 
article 190(A)—the rule for non-surviving spouse usufructs that 
relies on the open mine doctrine—and concluded that the spouse 
was entitled to the mineral proceeds because drilling operations 
commenced before the usufruct was created.22 A correct 
application of the law would have granted the surviving spouse the 
proceeds, regardless of whether there was an open mine at the time 
the usufruct was created.23  
Although the court in Quantum reached the correct result 
despite its unsound analysis, potential mineral rights beneficiaries 
in future cases may not fare as well should courts apply the 
Quantum court’s flawed reasoning.24 The court’s improper analysis 
highlights the importance of a usufruct’s classification when 
mineral rights are involved—specifically, whether a usufruct is in 
favor of a surviving spouse and not subject to the open mine 
                                                                                                             
 19. 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 20. Id. at 873–74. 
 21. Id. at 873. 
 22. Id. at 874. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 24. The Quantum court ultimately concluded that the spouse was entitled to 
the mineral rights. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 874. Thus, as discussed in Part IV.A, 
infra, the outcome was correct; however, as the hypothetical in the Introduction 
highlights, the analysis the court used could lead to improper results in the 
future. 
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doctrine under Louisiana Mineral Code article 190(B),25 or 
whether a usufruct is subject to the open mine doctrine under 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190(A) because it is legal or 
conventional.26 
The Quantum opinion also illustrates the importance of properly 
classifying a usufruct that arises when forced heirs exercise their 
right of reduction, an issue that the Quantum court did not address 
and one that has been blurred by a complicated legislative history 
and substantial policy changes in Louisiana.27 The answers to these 
complex issues have serious implications for future legatees who 
may be faced with circumstances similar to those presented in 
Quantum.28 As one of the nation’s leading oil and gas producers, it is 
important for Louisiana to assure landowners who bequeath property 
rich with minerals that their intent will be honored when they die. As 
a result of the court’s reasoning in Quantum, the intent of many 
Louisiana testators is in jeopardy and at the mercy of the courts.  
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Louisiana law 
with respect to forced heirship and surviving spouse usufructs, and 
it also examines the legislative policies behind the enactment of 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 and the article’s application to 
usufructs that include mineral rights. Part II discusses the facts and 
holding of Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil.29 Part III 
analyzes the scholarly debate over the proper classification of the 
usufruct that a surviving spouse receives when forced heirs reduce 
a disposition in full ownership. Part III further provides the proper 
solution to this debate and discusses the solution in light of 
Quantum. Part IV then highlights the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeal’s flawed reasoning in Quantum Resources v. Pirate 
Lake Oil in classifying the spouse’s usufruct and its application to 
Mineral Code article 190.30 This Part maintains that although the 
court reached the correct result, the proper classification of the 
usufruct in this case was a surviving spouse usufruct under Mineral 
Code article 190(B), which states that the usufruct is not subject to 
                                                                                                             
 25. See discussion infra Part II (defining the different types of surviving 
spouse usufructs); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000). 
 26. “The usufruct created by juridical act is called conventional; the 
usufruct created by operation of law is called legal.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 
(2015). 
 27. See discussion infra Part III. 
 28. The mineral royalties in this case amounted to $581,269.35. Petition in 
Concursus Proceeding at 15–20, Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (No. 686816) 
(exhibit A).  
 29. See Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867. 
 30. See id. 
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the open mine doctrine, and also cautions that, if followed, the 
court’s flawed analysis will cause incorrect results in future cases. 
I. LOUISIANA’S INSTITUTION OF FORCED HEIRSHIP, THE SURVIVING 
SPOUSE USUFRUCT, AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 190 
In Louisiana, a person dies either testate or intestate.31 Testate 
succession “results from the will of the deceased,”32 and intestate 
succession “results from provisions of law in favor of certain 
persons, in default of testate successors.”33 Historically, testators 
have been limited as to whom they could exclude from their will 
and the amount of their estate that they could bequeath due to 
Louisiana’s concept of forced heirship.34 In recent years, Louisiana 
has moved toward free testation by virtually abolishing forced 
heirship and by creating exceptions to the limited forced heirship 
regime that still exists, such as the creation of the surviving spouse 
usufruct.35 Most importantly, this policy change allows the “intent 
of the testator [to] control,” which is at the core of testamentary 
interpretation in Louisiana.36  
A. Protecting the Heirs with Forced Heirship 
A person in Louisiana has the right to use, enjoy, and dispose 
of his property as he pleases with certain limits that are established 
by law.37 One such limit is when certain descendants––forced 
heirs––are guaranteed a portion of the estate, called the forced 
portion.38 Historically, Louisiana’s doctrine of forced heirship was 
meant to provide support for the children of decedents by entitling 
them to a certain portion of their parents’ estate.39 Prior to 1995, all 
descendants of a decedent, regardless of age, were entitled to a 
portion of the decedent’s estate.40 However, in light of weakening 
familial ties and increased life expectancy, the desire for free 
testation increased so that a testator could do with his property as 
                                                                                                             
 31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 873 (2015). 
 32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015). 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 875 (2015). 
 34. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015); KATHRYN LORIO, SUCCESSIONS 
AND DONATIONS § 10.1, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 296 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 35. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015). 
 37. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (2015). 
 38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015); LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 
296. 
 39. LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 296. 
 40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989). 
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he saw fit.41 Thus in 1995, Article XII, Section 5, of the Louisiana 
Constitution was amended to abolish the concept of forced 
heirship, with two exceptions.42  
First, descendants of the first degree who are, at the time of the 
decedent’s death, 23 years old or younger are still forced heirs.43 
Second, descendants who are, or may be in the future, permanently 
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their 
estates because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity also 
qualify as forced heirs.44 Descendants who qualify under these two 
exceptions cannot be deprived of the “forced portion” of the 
decedent’s estate.45 The amount of the forced portion that is 
guaranteed to the forced heirs depends on the number of forced 
heirs.46 The forced portion is a total of one-fourth of the estate 
when there is only one forced heir and a total of one-half of the 
estate when there are two or more forced heirs.47 When a testator 
leaves forced heirs, but bequeaths a portion of his estate to others 
amounting to more than the law allows, the disposition is 
considered excessive.48  
An excessive disposition is an impingement on the forced 
portion of the forced heirs and although it is not null,49 forced heirs 
may demand that the excessive disposition be reduced to the extent 
necessary to eliminate the impingement.50 Therefore, forced heirs 
have the power to demand that excessive donations be reduced so 
that they may receive the portion of the estate to which they are 
legally entitled.51 However, some donations are not considered 
                                                                                                             
 41. The Louisiana State Legislature began to favor free testation when it 
increased the disposable portion—the portion of the testator’s estate that is 
freely disposable at the will of the testator—available to the surviving spouse 
and allowed for a lifetime usufruct over the portion that the descendants 
inherited. See Kathryn Lorio, The Changing Concept of Family and Its Effect on 
Louisiana Succession Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1177–78 (2003).  
 42. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 297. 
 43. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2015). 
 44. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2015). 
 45. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015). 
 46. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 314–18. 
 47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1495 (2015). 
 48. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 
(1989); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Legal Usufruct, The Surviving Spouse, and 
Article 890 of the Louisiana Civil Code: Heyday For Estate Planning, 49 LA. L. 
REV. 803, 824 (1989). 
 49. The legitime is the portion of the decedent’s estate that is guaranteed to 
each forced heir. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015).  
 50. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 
(1989). 
 51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.5, at 
318. 
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excessive and thus give the testator more freedom to dispose of his 
property without impinging on the legitime of the forced heirs.52  
B. The Surviving Spouse Usufruct as a Permissible Burden 
A usufruct is a real right of limited duration over the property of 
another.53 It can be created by juridical act, either inter vivos or 
mortis causa, or by operation of law––a usufruct that arises by 
operation of law is legal, and a usufruct that is created by juridical 
act is a conventional usufruct.54 A usufruct gives the usufructuary 
the usus and fructus over the thing subject to the usufruct; however, 
the forced heirs are entitled to the abusus over the thing.55 This 
means that a forced heir does not enjoy the property during the 
usufruct because the usufructuary is entitled to all of the fruits.56 
Typically, a testator cannot grant a usufruct over the forced portion; 
such a bequest is an impermissible burden on the forced heir’s 
legitime.57 However, one major exception is the power of a testator 
to leave a legacy granting a usufruct to the surviving spouse.58  
The usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse was originally a 
permissible burden on the forced heir’s portion because it arose 
under intestacy and, therefore, by operation of law.59 This was so 
that the surviving spouse could retain the family home and to 
ensure that the surviving spouse had sufficient resources to take 
care of herself and the surviving children.60 Beginning in 1888 
with Succession of Moore, courts have held that a testator may 
                                                                                                             
 52. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). See 
LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.10, at 336 (“A couple of exceptions existed that 
permitted the imposition of usufruct on the legitime.”). 
 53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 535 (2015). 
 54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2015).  
 55. If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the usufructuary 
may consume, alienate, or encumber them. LA. CIV. CODE art. 538 (2015). If the 
things subject to the usufruct are nonconsumables, the usufructuary has the right 
to possess them and to derive the advantages that they produce, but with the 
obligation of preserving their substance. LA. CIV. CODE art. 539 (2015). The 
usufructuary is also entitled to the fruits of the thing subject to usufruct. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 550 (2015).  
 56. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 550 (2015).  
 57. Louisiana Civil Code article 1496 states that “[n]o charges, conditions, 
or burdens may be imposed on the legitime except those expressly authorized by 
law, such as a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1496 
(2015). 
 58. See Cynthia A. Samuel, William M. Shaw, Jr. & Katherine S. Spaht, 
What Has Become of Forced Heirship?, 45 LA. L. REV. 575, 580 (1985). 
 59. See Succession of Moore, 4 So. 460 (La. 1888). 
 60. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.3, at 433. See generally Moore, 4 So. 
460; Hall v. Touissant, 28 So. 304, 305 (La. 1900). 
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bequeath a usufruct to his surviving spouse.61 In Moore, the 
testator bequeathed to his wife a testamentary lifetime usufruct 
over all of the property in his estate.62 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that the testator had the ability to leave a legacy to a 
surviving spouse that includes full ownership of the disposable 
portion and a usufruct over the community property that formed 
part of the forced heir’s legitime.63 The Court reasoned that such a 
legacy was not an impingement on the forced heir’s legitime 
because it was equivalent to a usufruct that arose under intestacy, 
which attached to community property by operation of law.64 Thus, 
the provision in the testator’s will that granted the usufruct was 
treated as a confirmation of a legal usufruct and, as such, attached 
to the testator’s community property by operation of law instead of 
by the testator’s will.65 
Similarly, in Winsberg v. Winsberg, the testator bequeathed all 
of his property to his wife in full ownership and, subsequently, his 
children moved to reduce.66 There was no mention of a usufruct in 
the decedent’s will; however, citing Moore, the Court found that a 
legacy of full ownership was not adverse to a usufruct created by 
law in favor of the surviving spouse.67 The Court stated that, in 
fact, the decedent intended to give his spouse more than the law 
allowed; thus, the decedent’s surviving spouse was entitled to a 
usufruct over the community property.68 Because the usufruct 
arose by operation of law and not by the juridical act of making the 
will, the usufruct did not impinge on the forced heir’s legitime.69  
Later, in Succession of Chauvin, the Supreme Court relied on 
the confirmation doctrine to determine the length of a usufruct that 
was confirmed by testament.70 In Chauvin, the testator bequeathed 
his entire estate to his son but made the bequest subject to a 
usufruct in favor of his wife; however, the testament did not 
                                                                                                             
 61. Moore, 4 So. at 461–64. 
 62. Id. at 461.  
 63. Id. at 464. See also Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972), 
overruled by statute, Act No. 77, 1996 La. Acts 1027. 
 64. Moore, 4 So. at 462. 
 65. See Moore, 4 So. at 463; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.8, at 449 
(According to the jurisprudence and article 1916, “a testamentary disposition 
that was not adverse to the interests of the surviving spouse did not defeat the 
legal usufruct under that article. Such a disposition merely confirmed the legal 
usufruct.”). 
 66. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 45–46 (La. 1957). 
 67. Id. at 48. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. See also Moore, 4 So. 460. 
 70. Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972). 
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specify the length of the usufruct.71 The Court held that the will 
“merely confirmed” the legal usufruct to the surviving spouse over 
all of the community property, and, because there was no 
indication in the will that the usufruct should be for life, the 
usufruct terminated upon death or remarriage.72 Chauvin illustrates 
that courts frequently used the doctrine of confirmation to 
determine the length of a usufruct when the length was not stated 
in the will.73  
A few years after Chauvin, the Court reaffirmed Moore and 
Winsberg in Succession of Waldron.74 In Waldron, the testator 
bequeathed to his wife a usufruct for life over his entire estate, 
which consisted of only community property.75 After the testator’s 
death, his daughter filed suit claiming that the usufruct was an 
impingement on her legitime.76 In holding that a bequest consisting 
of all of the testator’s community property was not an adverse 
disposition to a legal usufruct, the Court noted that it must interpret 
the will in a way that furthers the testator’s intent.77 Thus, the 
Court held that the spouse was entitled to a legal usufruct under 
former article 916, which meant that the spouse was entitled to a 
usufruct over the community property until remarriage.78 Again, 
because the usufruct was created by operation of law, it did not 
impinge on the forced heir’s legitime.79  
In 1975, the same year Waldron was decided, the Louisiana 
Legislature amended Louisiana Civil Code article 916,80 beginning 
the movement toward expanding the rights of Louisiana testators. 
The amendment of article 916 allowed a testator to grant, by 
testament, a lifetime usufruct over the forced portion without 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at 422. 
 72. Id. at 426.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. 1975).  
 75. Id. at 435. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 437–38. 
 78. Id. at 439. 
 79. Id. at 438. The predecessor to article 890, article 916, was the applicable 
law at the time of Waldron, but the analysis was the same. 
 80. An “unless” clause was added after the words “second marriage,” which 
stated: 
Unless the usufruct has been confirmed for life or any other designated 
period to the survivor by the last will and testament of the predeceased 
husband or wife, and the rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be 
subject to any such usufruct, which usufruct shall not be an 
impingement on the legitime. 
Act No. 680, 1975 La. Acts 1477–78. See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 
7.8, at 449; Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 805–06.  
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impinging on it.81 In 1979, the Legislature again expanded the 
rights of Louisiana testators by amending article 916 to allow a 
testator to grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over separate 
property, which was to be treated as a legal usufruct such that it 
was not an impingement on the forced portion.82 This amendment 
granted a testator even more freedom to dispose of his property by 
allowing him to grant a usufruct to his surviving spouse over both 
community and separate property.83 Two years later, article 916 
was repealed and replaced by Louisiana Civil Code article 890 in a 
legislative effort to overhaul the articles governing the surviving 
spouse usufruct.84 
Article 890 encompassed the intestate legal surviving spouse 
usufruct and the testamentary surviving spouse usufruct, and it 
made clear that neither impinged on the forced portion.85 A legal 
usufruct arose by operation of law in favor of the surviving spouse 
when the deceased died intestate with community property in his 
estate but also left descendants who qualified as forced heirs.86 
Because a legal usufruct arose by operation of law, not by 
testament, it did not impinge on the legitime of the forced heirs.87 
The testamentary surviving spouse usufruct, on the other hand, 
permitted the deceased to “by testament grant a usufruct for life or 
                                                                                                             
 81. The availability of a usufruct for life also allowed the surviving spouse 
to take advantage of the tax benefit afforded by the marital deduction because a 
usufruct only qualified for the deduction if it was granted for life. See I.R.C. § 
2056 (2012). 
 82. Act No. 678, 1979 La. Acts 1775 (“Further, a husband or wife may, by 
his or her last will and testament, grant a usufruct for life or any other designated 
period to the surviving spouse over so much of the separate property as may be 
inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor, and the rights of forced 
heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which usufruct thus 
granted shall be treated in the same fashion as a legal usufruct and not be an 
impingement upon the legitime.”).  
 83. Id. 
 84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). 
 85. Former article 890 provided in pertinent part:  
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, and shall not have 
disposed by testament of his share in the community property, the 
surviving spouse shall have a legal usufruct over so much of that share 
as may be inherited by the descendants. This usufruct terminates when 
the surviving spouse contracts another marriage, unless confirmed by 
testament for life or for a shorter period. The deceased may by 
testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter period to the 
surviving spouse over al or part of his separate property. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). See also Diane M. Lloyd, Comment, New Hope 
for the Survivor: The Changes in the Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 28 LOY. 
L. REV. 1095, 1101 (1982). 
 86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). 
 87. See Succession of Moore, 4 So. 460 (La. 1888). 
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for a shorter period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his 
separate property.”88 The Legislature, in revising article 890, 
specifically stated that a testamentary surviving spouse usufruct “is 
to be treated as a legal usufruct and is not an impingement upon 
legitime.”89 This provision was necessary to allow a testator greater 
freedom to dispose of his property because a testamentary usufruct 
over separate and community property in favor of the surviving 
spouse had historically been considered an impingement on the 
forced portion.90  
The testamentary usufruct that was “treated as a legal usufruct” 
created a challenge for courts faced with the task of determining the 
qualities of usufructs that arose under article 890, such as the type of 
property that the usufruct could encompass or when the usufruct 
terminated.91 For example, in Morgan v. Leach, the testatrix 
bequeathed all of her property to her husband, which resulted in a 
usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse due to the forced heir’s 
reduction of the legacy.92 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of 
Appeal held that the usufruct was legal because under article 890 it 
was treated as a testamentary confirmation of a legal usufruct.93 The 
court focused on the decedent’s testamentary intent and determined 
that the testatrix intended that her husband be given as much 
property as she was permitted to give him under the law.94 
Ultimately, the court stated that the surviving spouse was entitled to 
a lifetime usufruct over the entire forced portion but nonetheless 
classified the usufruct as legal, even though the usufruct did not 
terminate at remarriage as legal usufructs did.95  
In 1996, the same year that Morgan was decided, the Louisiana 
Legislature revised the Civil Code’s succession articles in an effort 
to conform to the newly modified doctrine of forced heirship under 
the constitutional amendments of 1995, which abolished forced 
heirship except in cases of 23-year-old descendants and physically 
or mentally incapable descendants.96 The 1996 amendment revised 
                                                                                                             
 88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). 
 89. Id. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 90. See Moore, 4 So. at 461–64. 
 91. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d 1381; Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434 
(La. 1975). Note that Waldron was decided under former Civil Code article 916, 
which was the predecessor to article 890; however, the same issues were 
presented. 
 92. Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1382–83. 
 93. Id. at 1383. 
 94. Id. at 1384. 
 95. Id. at 1384–85. 
 96. See supra Part I.A. 
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article 890 and enacted new article 1499.97 The revision created 
separate articles for the traditional legal surviving spouse usufruct 
that arose under intestacy and the testamentary surviving spouse 
usufruct.98 Under current law, article 890 solely governs legal 
usufructs that arise by operation of law.99 The intestacy legal 
surviving spouse usufruct was not revised in substance; thus, 
because there was no change in the law for such a usufruct, it still 
does not impinge on the forced portion because it is created by 
operation of law.100  
New article 1499 governs testamentary surviving spouse 
usufructs that were formerly governed by article 890 and states that 
“[t]he decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over 
all or part of his property, including the forced portion.”101 A 
usufruct under this article “is a permissible burden that does not 
impinge upon the legitime, whether it affects community property 
or separate property, whether it is for life or a shorter period, . . . 
and whether or not the usufructuary has the power to dispose of 
nonconsumables.”102 There is no need to “treat” it as a legal 
usufruct because it is currently authorized by law.103 Some scholars 
have argued that article 1499 legislatively overruled Succession of 
Chauvin104 by stating that the usufruct shall be for life unless 
expressly designated for a shorter period.105 In Chauvin, the Court 
held that a usufruct ended upon remarriage when a testator failed 
to specify the length of a testamentary usufruct.106 Although this 
may be true, Morgan indicated that courts were starting to trend 
toward allowing the usufruct to last for life due to the deference 
that courts give to a testator’s intent.107 Thus, new article 1499 
                                                                                                             
 97. Kerry J. Miller, Comment, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its 
Implementing Legislation, and Major Substantive Policy Changes of the 
Louisiana State Law Institute’s Proposed Comprehensive Revision of the 
Successions and Donations Laws, 71 TUL. L. REV. 223, 239–42 (1996). 
 98. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 99. New article 890 states that “[i]f the deceased spouse is survived by 
descendants, the surviving spouse shall have a usufruct over the decedent’s 
share of the community property to the extent that the decedent has not disposed 
of it by testament.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015).  
 100. See id. 
 101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra note 53.  
 104. Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972). 
 105. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 cmt. d (2015). See also Kathryn Venturatos 
Lorio, Forced Heirship: The Citadel Has Fallen—Or Has It?, 44 LA. B.J. 16, 18 
(1996). But see YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.8, at 450. 
 106. Chauvin, 257 So. 2d at 426. 
 107. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384–85 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
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does not represent a profound shift in the law beyond what was 
already established by the jurisprudence.  
C. Louisiana Mineral Code Article 190: Expanded Rights for the 
Surviving Spouse 
Typically under the Louisiana Civil Code, a usufructuary has 
the right to all fruits, which “are things that are produced by or 
derived from another thing without diminution of its substance.”108 
Neither mineral substances extracted from the ground nor bonuses, 
delay rentals, or royalties are classified as fruits because they 
diminish the value of the land and are not “born and reborn of the 
soil.”109  
By way of exception to this general rule, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Gueno v. Medlenka held that if there were open 
mines actually worked at the time the usufruct was created, the 
minerals and proceeds from mineral production would be treated 
as natural and civil fruits; thus, the usufructuary would be entitled 
to the mineral proceeds.110 In contrast, the Court also held that 
products derived from mines that were not open at the time the 
usufruct was created “must be excluded, from the fruits and 
products to which the usufructuary is entitled”; thus, the 
usufructuary has no right to minerals produced from a mine that 
was not opened until after the usufruct was created.111 This meant 
that the naked owner’s right to open new mines and reduce 
minerals to possession is unaffected by the subsequent creation of 
a usufruct. 112  
The exception created in Gueno was codified in 1974 when the 
Louisiana Legislature enacted the Mineral Code.113 Louisiana 
Mineral Code article 190 allowed a usufructuary to enjoy the 
landowner’s rights in minerals according to the principles set forth 
in Gueno.114 Prior to 1986, article 190 stated: 
If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse in 
community, that of parents during marriage, or any other legal 
usufruct, or if there is no provision including the use and 
                                                                                                             
 108. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 550–551 (2015). 
 109. Elder v. Ellerbe, 66 So. 337, 338 (La. 1914). See also Gueno v. 
Medlenka, 117 So. 2d 817 (La. 1960). 
 110. Gueno, 117 So. 2d at 822. 
 111. Id. See also King v. Buffington, 126 So. 2d 326, 328–29 (La. 1961). 
 112. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:195 (2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 
9, § 2:18, at 147.  
 113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 561 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000). 
 114. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000). 
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enjoyment of mineral rights in a conventional usufruct, the 
usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the 
landowner’s rights in minerals as to mines or quarries 
actually worked at the time the usufruct was created.115 
Thus, article 190 governed all usufructs, including surviving 
spouse usufructs, which were subject to Louisiana’s open mine 
doctrine.116 A usufructuary was entitled to the use and enjoyment 
of the minerals when there were “mines or quarries actually 
worked” at the time the usufruct was created.117 This meant that all 
usufructaries, regardless of the classification, were entitled to the 
proceeds from mineral production only when minerals were being 
produced from the land at the time the usufruct was created.118  
Subsequently, in 1986, the Legislature revised article 190 to 
expand the rights of the surviving spouse usufructuary.119 The 
Legislature added a second paragraph to article 190, which 
separated surviving spouse usufructs from all other types of 
usufructs.120 Currently, surviving spouse usufructs are governed by 
article 190(B), and all other usufructs that are not held by surviving 
spouses are governed by article 190(A).121 Distinguishing usufructs 
in favor of surviving spouses is critically important because the 
open mine doctrine does not apply to usufructs in favor of 
surviving spouses.122  
Article 190(A) is identical to pre-revision article 190, but it 
excludes surviving spouses; it affects usufructs of parents during 
marriage, other legal usufructs, and all conventional usufructs, 
                                                                                                             
 115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (1975). See Gueno, 117 So. 2d at 822 
(citing PLANIOL, in Vol. 1, No. 2794 TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL); 
see also Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas 
Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 820 (1992) 
(“Louisiana does have an open mine doctrine that is an exception to the rule that 
the naked owner of land enjoys the present benefit of the minerals. The open 
mine doctrine is found in Articles 190 and 191 of the Mineral Code.”). 
 116. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (1975).  
 117. Id. 
 118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:191 (2000). 
 119. Act No. 245, 1986 La. Acts 540 (“To amend and reenact R.S. 31:190, 
relative to the rights of usufructuaries in minerals; to provide that the usufruct of 
land of the surviving spouse includes the use and enjoyment of the landowner's 
rights in minerals, whether or not mines or quarries were actually worked at the 
creation of the usufruct; and to provide for related matters.”). Mineral Code 
article 190 was “designed to expand the benefits of a usufructuary.” Patrick H. 
Martin, Developments in the Law 1990–1991, Mineral Rights, 52 LA. L. REV. 
677, 697 (1992). 
 120. See Act No. 245, 1986 La. Acts 540. 
 121. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000). 
 122. See id. 
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including testamentary usufructs, that do not have provisions 
limiting the use and enjoyment of minerals.123 All usufructs under 
article 190(A) are still subject to the open mine doctrine.124 
However, surviving spouse usufructs are currently governed by 
article 190(B), which states: 
If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse, whether 
legal or conventional, and there is no contrary provision in 
the instrument creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is 
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner’s rights 
in minerals, whether or not mines or quarries were actually 
worked at the time the usufruct was created. However, the 
rights to which the usufructuary is thus entitled shall not 
include the right to execute a mineral lease without the 
consent of the naked owner.125 
Thus, under article 190(B), surviving spouse usufructs, both 
legal and testamentary, are not subject to the open mine 
doctrine.126 Instead, a surviving spouse usufructuary is entitled to 
the mineral rights—regardless of when the usufruct was created or 
whether the mine was open.127 The Legislature expanded the rights 
of the surviving spouse usufruct because it ensures that a surviving 
spouse has sufficient support by always receiving the use and 
enjoyment of the landowner’s rights in minerals.128 Enjoyment of 
the landowner’s rights in minerals means that the surviving spouse 
is entitled to mineral royalties irrespective of whether the mine was 
open at the time the usufruct was created. Thus, a surviving spouse 
usufructuary, whether legal or testamentary, will receive all of the 
proceeds that arise out of mineral production in all circumstances, 
regardless of when oil operations began or when the usufruct was 
created.129  
                                                                                                             
 123. Section 31:190(A) states:  
If a usufruct of land is that of parents during marriage, or any other legal 
usufruct, or if there is no provision including the use and enjoyment of 
mineral rights in a conventional usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to 
the use and enjoyment of the landowners rights in minerals as to mines or 
quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was created.  
Id. § 31:190(A). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. § 31:190(B). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 2:21, at 155 (“This deviation from 
traditional principles is justified in light of the solicitude for the interests of the 
surviving spouse.”). 
 129. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(B) (2000). 
846 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
II. QUANTUM RESOURCES V. PIRATE LAKE OIL: A FLAWED ANALYSIS 
In 2012, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal was faced 
with a case that included issues of forced heirship, surviving 
spouse usufructs, and Louisiana Mineral Code article 190. The 
case was Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil, and the court had 
the task of determining how Louisiana succession law and 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 worked together.  
On May 30, 1989, Elizabeth Jones died testate in Texas.130 At 
the time of her death, the only property that Elizabeth owned in 
Louisiana was a tract of land (“the tract”) that she inherited from 
her father,131 and that land was accordingly classified as her 
separate property under Louisiana law.132 In her will, Elizabeth 
bequeathed all of her property, including the tract, to her husband, 
Allen Jones.133 Although Elizabeth and Allen’s three children were 
excluded from her will, at the time of her death, her children were 
classified as forced heirs under Louisiana law.134 
As forced heirs, the Jones children were entitled to claim the 
forced portion of their mother’s estate,135 despite the fact that she 
omitted them from her will.136 Several years after their mother’s 
death, the children initiated ancillary succession proceedings,137 
                                                                                                             
 130. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012). Under Louisiana law, “[t]estate succession results from the will 
of the deceased, contained in a testament executed in a form prescribed by law.” 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015).  
 131. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 1, Quantum, 
105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256). 
 132. Separate property includes “property acquired by a spouse by 
inheritance or donation to him individually.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2015).  
 133. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.  
 134. Id. Also, Louisiana Civil Code article 870(B) states, “[t]estate and 
intestate succession rights, including the right to claim as a forced heir, are 
governed by the law in effect on the date of the decedent’s death.” LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 870(B) (2015). At the time of Elizabeth Jones’s death, all descendants 
of a decedent were considered forced heirs. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989). 
In 1989, the Louisiana Legislature attempted to revise the forced heirship laws, 
but the Supreme Court in Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), held 
that revision unconstitutional. Thus, the old forced heirship law should have 
governed. 
 135. Louisiana Civil Code article 1495 states that “[t]he portion reserved for 
the forced heirs is called the forced portion and the remainder is called the 
disposable portion.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1495 (2015). 
 136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989) (“Donations inter vivos or mortis causa 
cannot exceed three-fourths of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his 
decease, one child; and one-half, if he leaves two or more children.”). 
 137. An ancillary succession proceeding may be opened when a deceased 
nonresident leaves property situated in Louisiana. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
3401 (2015). 
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demanding reduction of the disposition made to their father in the 
will.138 In 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of possession 
recognizing Allen as having full ownership of the disposable 
portion and recognizing the Jones children as naked owners of the 
forced portion, subject to a usufruct that terminated at death in 
favor of their father.139 
In May 1996, prior to the institution of succession proceedings, 
Quantum Resources L.L.C. and Milagro Production L.L.C. began 
producing oil on the tract.140 Unsure of who was entitled to the 
proceeds from the oil production, Quantum and Milagro later filed 
a concursus proceeding so that they would not be liable for paying 
the proceeds to the incorrect party.141 Both Allen and the Jones 
children asserted claims for the royalties: Allen as usufructuary 
and the Jones children as naked owners.142 As a result of the 
competing claims, the court was called upon to decide which party 
was entitled to the mineral royalties under Louisiana Mineral Code 
article 190.143  
On appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit, in deciding which party 
was entitled to the mineral proceeds, first found that the judgment 
of possession, a “juridical act,” created the usufruct.144 The court 
therefore concluded that the inception of the usufruct was in 1999, 
when the judgment of possession was rendered.145 Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
 138. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869. 
 139. Id. In Quantum, the judgment of possession was not annulled, amended 
or modified. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 2, 
Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256). See also LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2012) (“The judgment of possession rendered in a 
succession proceeding shall be prima facie evidence of the relationship to the 
deceased of the parties recognized therein, as heir, legatee, surviving spouse in 
community, or usufructuary, as the case may be, and of their right to the 
possession of the estate of the deceased.”). A naked owner is one who “enjoys 
prerogatives of ownership to the extent that they do not interfere with the 
enjoyment of the usufructuary. Accordingly, during the existence of the 
usufruct, the rights of the naked owner begin where the rights of the 
usufructuary end.” YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 5.3, at 341. See also LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 603 (2015) (“The naked owner may dispose of the naked 
ownership, but he cannot thereby affect the usufruct.”).  
 140. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 2–3, 
Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256). 
 141. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 868. A concursus proceeding is “one in which 
two or more persons having competing or conflicting claims to money, property, 
or mortgages or privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their 
respective claims contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding.” LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4651 (2015). 
 142. See Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869. 
 143. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000). 
 144. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 873. 
 145. Id. at 873–74. 
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the court found that there were open mines at the time the usufruct 
was created, because oil production began in 1996, which was 
prior to the issuance of the judgment of possession.146 The court 
next held that article 190(B) was inapplicable in this case.147 
Without stating reasons, the court found that Allen was a legatee of 
Elizabeth’s will rather than a surviving spouse, even though Allen 
was, in fact, Elizabeth’s surviving spouse. Therefore, the court 
held that Mineral Code article 190(B) did not apply.148 Ultimately, 
the court applied Mineral Code article 190(A) and awarded the 
mineral proceeds to Allen because there were open mines when the 
usufruct was created, which meant that Allen as usufructuary was 
entitled to the mineral rights.149 Although this outcome ultimately 
was correct, the court’s analysis could lead to incorrect results by 
subjecting a surviving spouse usufruct to the open mine doctrine. 
III. A SCHOLARLY DEBATE: THE PROPER METHOD OF REDUCTION 
WHEN A TESTATOR BEQUEATHS ALL OF HIS PROPERTY IN FULL 
OWNERSHIP TO HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE  
When an heir moves to reduce an excessive disposition in 
succession proceedings, an initial step is for the trial court to 
render a judgment of possession, which recognizes the relationship 
between the parties and sends the heirs and legatees into 
possession of the estate.150 The correct method of reduction when a 
testator bequeaths all of his separate and community property to 
his surviving spouse was not discussed in Quantum because the 
court noted that it was not ripe for a decision; however, the 
question is of great importance because higher courts give great 
deference to judgments of possession until a party to the litigation 
questions the judgment in a nullity action.151 
A. The Debate 
Under current Louisiana law, it is clear that a testator has the 
freedom to grant a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse over his 
separate and community property so that the surviving spouse 
receives the maximum amount of his estate allowed by law, even 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at 874. 
 147. Id. at 873–74. 
 148. The court stated, “[h]e inherited full ownership of his deceased wife’s 
separate property as a legatee of his deceased wife, not as her surviving 
spouse.” Id. at 873. 
 149. Id. at 874. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(A) (2000).  
 150. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3061 (2015). 
 151. See, e.g., Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869 n.2. 
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when the testator dies and is survived by forced heirs.152 A 
question arises, however, as to the proper method of reduction 
when a decedent dies testate, bequeathing his separate and 
community property in full ownership to his surviving spouse but 
leaving forced heirs who are entitled to their forced portion. 
Because the forced heirs are entitled to demand reduction, the 
surviving spouse’s bequest must be reduced at the request of the 
forced heirs in order to satisfy their forced portion.153 Accordingly, 
it must be determined whether the surviving spouse is entitled to a 
usufruct over the forced portion at all and, if so, the proper 
classification of the usufruct. Under prior law, this was determined 
by the jurisprudence on the doctrine of confirmation.154 Today, the 
answer depends on the proper interpretation of Louisiana Civil 
Code article 1503, which details the extent to which dispositions 
impinging upon the forced portion must be reduced.155 The change 
in the law has sparked debate among legal scholars as to the extent 
of reduction that article 1503 requires.156 
Under article 1503, “[a] donation . . . that impinges upon the 
legitime of a forced heir is not null but is merely reducible to the 
extent necessary to eliminate the impingement.”157 However, under 
current law, the extent of reduction that is necessary to eliminate 
the impingement is a point of debate. There are at least two 
competing scholarly views on the method of reduction that should 
be employed when a testator leaves all of his property to his 
surviving spouse. 
The first approach, mentioned in the comments to article 1503, 
is based on a textual analysis of the reduction articles, in particular 
articles 1499 and 1503.158 Article 1499 states that a usufruct 
bequeathed to a surviving spouse “is a permissible burden that 
does not impinge on the legitime, whether it affects community or 
separate property.”159 Further, article 1503 states, “[a] donation . . . 
that impinges upon the legitime of a forced heir is not null but is 
merely reducible to the extent necessary to eliminate the 
impingement.”160 Thus, article 1503 only requires the minimum 
                                                                                                             
 152. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 153. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 154. See discussion supra Part I.B; Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422, 
426 (La. 1972).  
 155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 156. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes).  
 157. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 158. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 160. LA. CIV. CODE art.1503 (2015). 
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reduction that is sufficient to satisfy each forced heir’s legitime.161 
Because a usufruct under article 1499 is a permissible burden and 
not an impingement on the legitime, the first scholarly approach 
advocates that a legacy in full ownership over all of the testator’s 
property in favor of the surviving spouse should be reduced to a 
lifetime testamentary usufruct under article 1499 over both 
separate and community property with the power to dispose of 
nonconsumables.162  
Accordingly, the usufruct will not terminate if the usufructuary 
remarries, as the legal usufruct does.163 Also, with the power to 
dispose of nonconsumables, the usufructuary may lease, alienate, or 
encumber immovable property that is included in the testator’s 
separate or community property.164 This means that the surviving 
spouse can sell, lease, or take out a mortgage on immovable 
property, such as the family home. Also, at the option of the 
usufructuary, the usufruct of nonconsumables may be transformed 
into a usufruct of consumables.165 This is accomplished when the 
surviving spouse sells a nonconsumable, such as the family home, 
and uses the cash from the sale, which is a consumable, for other 
purposes––although the surviving spouse is accountable for the 
money at the end of the usufruct.166 Thus, the forced heirs are 
entitled to naked ownership of the forced portion, and the 
surviving spouse is entitled to a lifetime testamentary usufruct over 
the entire forced portion as well as full ownership of the disposable 
portion, which is the portion unaffected by the reduction.167  
                                                                                                             
 161. See id. 
 162. “The right to dispose of a nonconsumable thing includes the rights to 
lease, alienate, and encumber the thing.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015). 
However, “[i]t does not include the right to alienate by donation inter vivos, 
unless that right is expressly granted.” Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 
(2015).  
 163. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 
(2015). 
 164. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015). 
 165. Heirs of Michel v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399 (1882). Compare LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 538 (2015) (“If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the 
usufructuary becomes owner of them”), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 539 (2015) (“If 
the things subject to the usufruct are nonconsumables, the usufructuary has the 
right to possess them and to derive the utility, profits, and advantages that they 
may produce, under the obligation of preserving their substance.”). 
 166. See generally Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 539 
(2015) (“He is bound to use them as a prudent administrator and to deliver them 
to the naked owner at the termination of the usufruct.”).  
 167. This approach is supported by comment (b) of article 1503. “[I]f the 
husband’s will leaves all to his wife and there is a forced heir who is entitled to 
one-fourth, the legacy to the wife is reduced to the disposable portion in full 
ownership and a usufruct for life . . . over the forced portion, since that usufruct 
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Notably, this method of reduction was used under former 
article 890 in Morgan v. Leach.168 In Morgan, the court, in 
determining what the testatrix meant by “the entirety of my estate 
in full ownership,” looked to her intent.169 The court found that 
article 1502, the reduction article under previous law, only 
required reduction to the extent necessary to eliminate the 
impingement; thus, the surviving spouse received a lifetime 
usufruct over community and separate property.170 Also, finding 
that it should interpret the will in a way that furthers the testatrix’s 
intent, the court found that because the testatrix bequeathed all of 
her property in full ownership to her surviving spouse, she 
intended to give her surviving spouse the maximum portion of her 
estate allowable by law.171 Thus, the first scholarly approach 
appears to follow prior law on this issue.  
The second scholarly approach, on the other hand, recognizes 
the possibility that the surviving spouse should receive a legal 
usufruct under article 890 over the forced portion under the 
doctrine of confirmation of a legal usufruct by testament.172 This 
approach, which is set out in the editor’s notes, mentions Winsberg 
v. Winsberg to illustrate that the doctrine of confirmation of a legal 
usufruct was relied on under the prior law.173 In Winsberg, the 
Court held that an excessive disposition in favor of a surviving 
spouse was a confirmation of a legal usufruct and that the usufruct 
over the forced portion in favor of the surviving spouse was not an 
impingement on the legitime.174 However, in Winsberg, the 
surviving spouse only received a usufruct over the forced portion 
that consisted of community property, as legal usufructs under 
article 890 only attach to community property.175  
Under the second approach, the forced heirs would receive full 
ownership of separate property included in the forced portion and 
                                                                                                             
 
could have been left to her expressly under Article 1499.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1503 cmt. b (2015). 
 168. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 169. Id. at 1383–84. 
 170. Id. at 1384. 
 171. Id.  
 172. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes); see also Morgan, 
680 So. 2d at 1383. 
 173. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes).  
 174. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 47–48 (La. 1957); A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Surviving Spouse and 
the Legitime of Descendants, 28 LA. L. REV. 509, 520 (1967). 
 175. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes); see also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that legal usufructs only extend to community 
property).  
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naked ownership of the testator’s share of community property 
included in the forced portion. The surviving spouse would receive 
full ownership of the disposable portion and a legal usufruct under 
article 890 over the forced portion, which means that the usufruct 
would only encompass community property.176 Further, the 
surviving spouse would not be entitled to a usufruct over separate 
property that forms part of the forced portion, unlike in the textual 
approach.177 Also, the usufruct would terminate upon remarriage 
instead of lasting for life.178  
The debate over the proper method of reduction is of great 
importance to the usufructuary and the forced heirs because it 
determines what the usufruct encompasses and how long it will 
last. Thus, a solution to this debate will greatly help courts in 
deciding the qualities of a usufruct when a testator leaves all of his 
property to his surviving spouse in full ownership and the forced 
heirs exercise their right to reduce. 
B. The Solution: Usufruct for Life over Separate and Community 
Property with the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables 
Considering that the intent of the testator controls the 
interpretation of his testament, the most effective way to solve the 
debate over the proper method of reduction is to use the approach 
that will conform best to the intent of the testator.179 The method of 
reduction that should be used when a testator bequeaths all of his 
property to his surviving spouse is to reduce the excessive legacy 
to a usufruct under article 1499—a usufruct for life over separate 
and community property with the power to dispose of 
                                                                                                             
 176. A legal usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse terminates upon 
remarriage or death, whichever occurs first. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015). 
 177. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 
(2015). 
 178. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015). Professor Yiannopoulos also stated 
that there is possibly a third approach to reduction. He stated that “if it were 
maintained that the doctrine of confirmation has been suppressed in the 1996 
revision, the surviving spouse should merely receive the disposable portion in 
full ownership.” See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes). However, 
as Professor Yiannopoulos observed, “[o]ne may seriously doubt, however, that 
the doctrine of confirmation of the legal usufruct by will, established by 
Louisiana jurisprudence constante commencing with the Succession of Moore 
has been overruled legislatively by a comment which is neither law nor source 
of law.” Id. Thus, due to the long line of Louisiana cases that all relied on the 
doctrine of confirmation, it is unlikely that the entire doctrine of confirmation is 
no longer valid. 
 179. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. Ct. App. 1996); 
Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. 1975). 
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nonconsumables.180 The Louisiana Civil Code requires that a 
testament be interpreted in a way that furthers, rather than 
frustrates, the testator’s intent.181 Accordingly, it is only proper to 
give the surviving spouse as close as possible to what the testator 
intended.182 When a testator leaves all of his property to his spouse 
in full ownership, he obviously intended to give his spouse the 
most that he was allowed to bequeath by law. However, if forced 
heirs are entitled to a portion of his estate, he is unable to give his 
surviving spouse everything that he owns in full ownership.183 
Under article 1499, the maximum amount of property that a 
testator can bequeath to his surviving spouse is full ownership of 
the disposable portion and a usufruct over community and separate 
property that terminates upon the death of the usufructuary.184  
Given the importance of upholding the testator’s intent in 
Louisiana succession law, a usufruct under article 1499 leads to a 
better result than a legal usufruct under article 890 that only 
encompasses community property. First, a usufruct for life is more 
beneficial to the surviving spouse because the usufruct will not 
terminate unless the surviving spouse dies,185 whereas a legal 
usufruct terminates if and when the surviving spouse remarries.186 
This interpretation ensures that, even if the surviving spouse 
remarries, she will have enough support to take care of herself and 
the surviving children. Notably, the court in Morgan held that a 
usufruct, which arose from a bequest of all of the testator’s 
property in full ownership, was for life, especially when it was clear 
that the testator intended to give the spouse the maximum permitted 
under law.187 
Second, a testamentary usufruct under article 1499 encompasses 
separate and community property,188 whereas a legal usufruct under 
article 890 only attaches to community property.189 Granting the 
surviving spouse a usufruct that encompasses separate and 
                                                                                                             
 180. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015). 
 182. See id.; Succession of Mydland, 653 So. 2d 8, 11–12 (La. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 183. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015). 
 184. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015). 
 185. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015) (stating that a usufruct under this 
article is for life, unless there is a contrary provision in the testament). 
 186. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that the usufruct ends upon 
remarriage). 
 187. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 188. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015) (stating that the testator may grant a 
usufruct over separate and community property). 
 189. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that a legal usufruct will be 
only over community property). 
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community property allows the surviving spouse to have the use 
and enjoyment of all the testator’s property, regardless of the type 
of property. Allowing the usufruct to encompass a larger portion of 
the testator’s property, rather than limiting the usufruct to 
community property, ensures a greater likelihood that the surviving 
spouse has sufficient support and that the usufruct better conforms 
to the testator’s intent.190  
The surviving spouse will also have the power to dispose of 
nonconsumables under an article 1499 usufruct.191 This means that 
the usufructuary has the power to lease, alienate, and encumber 
immovable things, such as the family home, without the consent of 
the forced heirs.192 A legal usufruct under article 890 does not have 
the right to dispose of nonconsumables because the usufruct is 
created by operation of law, and this right may only be granted by 
express disposition.193 However, under article 1499, a testator may 
grant the power to dispose of nonconsumables; thus, since the law 
allows the testator to grant the surviving spouse this right, the 
usufructuary is entitled to dispose of nonconsumables so that she 
may receive the maximum amount of property that the law 
allows.194 
A usufruct under article 1499 also conforms to the policy 
changes driving the 1996 revision because Louisiana is moving 
away from favoring forced heirs and currently allows a testator 
more freedom to bequeath his property to whomever he wants. 
When a testator bequeaths all of his property to his surviving 
spouse, the testator most likely intended to give his surviving 
spouse as much as the law allows, and a usufruct under article 
1499 grants the most support to the surviving spouse.195 It also 
furthers another purpose of the 1996 revision, which was “to 
present the rules in a coherent framework that should be practical 
and workable.”196 This method of reduction is more practical and 
workable than the approach that employs the doctrine of 
confirmation because it is based on a simple textual analysis of 
articles 1499 and 1503, which are easily applied to an excessive 
donation. The method of reduction that grants a legal usufruct 
under article 890 is based on the jurisprudential doctrine of 
                                                                                                             
 190. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015); see also Heirs of Michel v. Knox, 34 
La. Ann. 399 (1882). 
 193. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015). 
 194. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 195. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 1177–78.  
 196. Act No. 77, 1996 La. Acts 1016 (introductory note). 
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confirmation, the validity of which has been questioned.197 Thus, 
in deciding judgments of possession when an excessive legacy is 
left in full ownership in favor of a surviving spouse and a forced 
heir moves to reduce the excessive disposition, courts should 
reduce the legacy to a usufruct under article 1499––a usufruct for 
life over separate and community property with the power to 
dispose of nonconsumables.198 
C. Application to Quantum 
In Quantum, the court was not faced with the question of the 
method of reduction when a testator leaves his entire estate in full 
ownership to the surviving spouse; however, a few years after their 
mother’s death, the Jones children moved to reduce the excessive 
legacy in favor of their father in order to satisfy their forced 
portion.199 The 24th Judicial District Court issued a judgment of 
possession recognizing Allen as the universal legatee of his wife and 
the Jones children as forced heirs who were entitled to reduce their 
father’s legacy.200 Ultimately, the trial court found that Allen was 
entitled to full ownership of the disposable portion of Elizabeth’s 
estate and to a lifetime usufruct over the forced portion, which 
consisted entirely of separate property.201 Subsequently, the forced 
heirs filed a petition for annulment,202 which attacked the judgment 
of possession alleging that, inter alia, a lifetime usufruct over the 
entire estate impinged on their individual legitimes.203 The trial 
court had not ruled on the annulment matter at the time the 
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decided Quantum. The 
Fifth Circuit found that the judgment of possession was valid and 
final and did not issue an opinion on the annulment matter.204  
                                                                                                             
 197. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 198. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015). 
 199. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012).  
 200. Id. at 869. 
 201. Id. at 869–70. 
 202. Article 2004 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that “a 
final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.” LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. art. 2004 (2015). 
 203. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869. 
 204. The Quantum court addressed the annulment matter in a footnote, 
stating:  
In September of 2010, Jennifer Jones and her brother, Patrick Jones, 
filed a separate proceeding in the 24th Judicial District Court entitled 
“Petition for Annulment of Judgment Obtained by Fraud and Ill 
Practices,” Docket No. 692–379 (they were not joined by their sister 
Jacqueline, who appears in other pleadings in this record aligned with 
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The Quantum court missed an opportunity to discuss the proper 
method of reduction when there is an excessive legacy in full 
ownership of the entire estate in favor of the surviving spouse. 
Luckily for the parties involved, the 24th Judicial District Court 
used the method of reduction that conforms best to the intent of the 
testator by recognizing Allen as the full owner of the disposable 
portion with a lifetime usufruct over the entire forced portion, 
which included solely separate property.205 Thus, when reducing 
excessive legacies, trial courts must use the method of reduction 
that is most faithful to the testator’s intent, which, as the trial court 
properly held in this case, is full ownership of the disposable 
portion and a lifetime usufruct over the entire estate in favor of the 
surviving spouse.206  
IV. QUANTUM AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 190: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF PROPERLY CLASSIFYING A USUFRUCT 
The Quantum court was next faced with classifying the 
usufruct and applying that classification to Mineral Code article 
190. According to the Louisiana Mineral Code, a usufruct of land 
does not typically include the landowner’s rights in minerals.207 
However, Mineral Code article 190 specifies two exceptions to the 
general rule that apply to usufructs.208 Usufructs in favor of 
surviving spouses, whether classified as legal or conventional, are 
entitled to the mineral rights regardless of whether there were open 
mines at the time the usufruct was created.209 All usufructs that are 
                                                                                                             
 
Mr. Jones). Therein, they attack the Judgment of Possession rendered in 
the ancillary succession proceeding, contending that they had no 
knowledge of the ancillary succession proceeding, despite the fact that 
the matter was filed on their behalf, denying the validity of their 
signatures on those pleadings. They also argued that it was a conflict of 
interest for the same counsel to represent them and their father, one that 
they did not waive. Another part of the petition asserted that awarding 
them naked ownership subject to Mr. Jones’ usufruct rather than full 
ownership of the forced portion impinged upon their legitime. As of the 
date of the issuance of this opinion, there has been no judgment in the 
annulment matter. Thus, the Judgment of Possession rendered in the 
Ancillary Succession remains valid and final at this time. We express 
no opinion in the annulment matter or how a nullity judgment in that 
suit might affect the instant matter. 
 Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869 n.2. 
 205. Id. at 873. 
 206. Id. at 869–70. 
 207. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:188 (2000). 
 208. Id. § 31:190. 
 209. Id. § 31:190(B). 
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held by persons other than surviving spouses are subject to the 
open mine doctrine and are not entitled to the mineral rights if 
drilling operations began prior to the creation of the usufruct.210 
Thus, in order to correctly apply Mineral Code article 190, it is 
important to determine the usufruct’s classification and if the 
usufruct is in favor of a surviving spouse.211  
A. Classifying a Usufruct That Is Reduced from Full Ownership 
Under Current Law 
When a testator bequeaths more of his property than the law 
allows to someone other than the forced heirs, and the forced heirs 
later reduce the excessive disposition, the usufruct must be 
classified as legal or conventional to determine the qualities of the 
usufruct. One may think, as the Louisiana Fifth Circuit in Quantum 
thought, that an excessive disposition in full ownership creates a 
conventional usufruct that is created by a juridical act––the 
judgment of possession.212 The Fifth Circuit argued that the forced 
heir’s right to reduce is optional; thus, if the forced heirs did not 
exercise their right to reduce, the universal legatee would retain 
full ownership over all of the community and separate property.213 
Under this view, the judgment of possession created the usufruct 
because if the trial court had not made a judicial determination of 
reduction there would be no usufruct.214 The usufruct would 
therefore be classified as conventional because it was created by a 
juridical act––although the result is correct, the reasoning is 
seriously flawed.215  
It is well settled that judgments of possession do not create 
rights;216 legatees and heirs’ rights arise from a testator’s will or by 
operation of law, not a judgment of possession.217 A judgment of 
possession simply recognizes the rights to which legatees and heirs 
are entitled and sends the parties into possession of the property.218 
                                                                                                             
 210. Id. § 31:190(A). 
 211. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 212. Quantum Res. Mgmt.v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012).  
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2015). 
 216. “In a judgment of possession, an heir ‘acquires nothing . . . that was not 
already his by operation of law.’” Scalise, Jr., supra note 13, at 434 (citations 
omitted). 
 217. See Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355, 359 (1883) (“We are bound to 
find his rights, if they exist, in the will and not in an ex parte order of a court.”).  
 218. See Succession of Prutzman, 209 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. Ct. App. 1968) 
(citing former Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3062). 
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3061 explicitly states 
that a judgment of possession “shall recognize” the relationship 
between the petitioner and the deceased.219 Further, Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure article 3062 provides that a judgment of 
possession is prima facie evidence of the relationship of the parties 
to the deceased recognized in the judgment.220 Articles 3061 and 
3062 illustrate the well-settled fact that a judgment of possession 
merely recognizes rights––it does not create rights.221  
A forced heir’s optional right of reduction does not have any 
legal impact on the fact that a judgment of possession does not 
confer rights. Although it is true that an heir or legatee would not 
have a usufruct if the forced heirs did not exercise their right of 
reduction, the judgment of possession still does not create any 
rights.222 Accordingly, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit’s view in 
Quantum that the judgment of possession created the usufruct is 
faulty because it is impossible for a judgment of possession to 
create rights.223  
Under current law, the proper classification for such a usufruct–
–one recognized by a judgment of possession from an excessive 
disposition in full ownership––is a conventional usufruct. This type 
of usufruct is created by a decedent’s testament––a juridical act––
and can be classified as conventional or “testamentary.”224 The 
usufruct arises out of the testator’s will because the testator’s 
bequest in full ownership is reduced to an amount that is sufficient 
to satisfy the forced portion.225 The bequest in full ownership 
includes the usus, fructus, and abusus.226 After reduction, the forced 
heirs become the naked owners, which includes the right of abusus, 
and the usufructuary is left with the usus and fructus.227 Thus, the 
usufruct is the remnant of the testator’s bequest in full ownership 
after the forced heirs exercise their right of reduction and the 
legitime is satisfied. 
It is essential not only to classify the usufruct, but also to 
correctly identify the source of the usufruct in order to determine 
when the usufruct arises. One may also think, as did the Quantum 
                                                                                                             
 219. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3061 (2015). 
 220. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2015); Taylor v. Williams, 110 So. 
100, 101 (La. 1926). 
 221. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 3061–3062 (2015). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Scalise, Jr., supra note 13, at 434. 
 224. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015). 
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 226. See supra note 50. 
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court, that the judgment of possession created the usufruct, and 
thus the usufruct arose when the judgment of possession was 
rendered.228 However, this ignores the fact that the “[s]uccession 
occurs at the death of a person,”229 and Louisiana’s concept of 
seizin, which invests heirs with the ability to exercise possession 
over the estate at the death of the decedent.230 After identifying the 
correct source of the usufruct—the testator’s will rather than the 
judgment of possession—there is but one logical point in time at 
which the usufruct could arise––at the death of the decedent.231 
Because the successor is vested with the decedent’s entire estate at 
death by the bequest in full ownership, the fact that the judgment of 
possession later recognized that the forced heirs, as naked owners, 
were entitled to the abusus does not cause the usufruct to arise when 
the judgment of possession was granted. Further, holding that the 
usufruct is created when the judgment of possession is rendered also 
creates uncertainty and confusion because judgments of possession 
can be changed or annulled,232 whereas the date of the death of the 
decedent can never be changed.  
Next, it must be determined whether the usufruct is in favor of a 
surviving spouse. If the usufruct is in favor of a surviving spouse, 
then the usufruct will not be subject to the open mine doctrine, and 
the usufructuary will receive the mineral rights regardless of when 
the usufruct was created.233 One may argue, as the Louisiana Fifth 
Circuit argued in Quantum, that even though the usufructuary was 
the decedent’s surviving spouse, the spouse was not a surviving 
spouse within the meaning of the Mineral Code because the spouse 
inherited the decedent’s property as the legatee of the will––not as 
the surviving spouse.234 Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion 
that the usufruct is conventional and is not in favor of a surviving 
spouse; thus, Mineral Code article 190(A) must be applied instead 
of article 190(B).  
This view is also flawed because if a spouse is, in fact, the 
surviving spouse, then the spouse should also be a surviving 
spouse under the Mineral Code. Mineral Code article 190 was 
separated into two articles in order to provide that all successors 
who were surviving spouses would not be subject to the open mine 
                                                                                                             
 228. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 934 (2015). 
 230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 935 (2015). 
 231. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 934 (2015). 
 232. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2004 (2015). 
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Ct. App. 2012). 
860 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
doctrine.235 Therefore, if a spouse who is, in fact, a surviving spouse 
is not considered a surviving spouse under the Mineral Code, then 
the revision and article 190(B) would be simply surplusage and 
would be rendered meaningless.236 There is also no support in the 
Mineral Code for the court’s proposition that a true surviving spouse 
should be treated as a legatee of the decedent’s will.237  
Accordingly, a true surviving spouse should be correctly 
classified as a surviving spouse for purposes of the Mineral Code; 
thus, because the usufruct is that of a surviving spouse, Mineral 
Code article 190(B) should apply. Under article 190(B), the 
usufruct is not subject to the open mine doctrine, which means that 
the surviving spouse receives the mineral rights regardless of when 
the usufruct was created or when drilling operations began.238 This 
result also best conforms to the testator’s intent because the 
surviving spouse will receive the mineral rights, which will 
provide more support for the surviving spouse. It is also consistent 
with the intent behind the creation of Mineral Code article 190(B) 
because it expands the rights of the usufructuary.239  
Even though the usufructuary is entitled to the mineral rights, 
the forced heirs are not without hope. Generally, under Mineral 
Code article 192, a usufructuary has the right to grant mineral 
leases as long as the land is not burdened with an ongoing lease.240 
However, under article 190(B), a surviving spouse usufruct does 
not include the right to execute a mineral lease without the consent 
of the naked owners.241 Thus, the forced heirs have the power to 
grant mineral leases on the property, which entitles them to retain 
bonuses and rental payments.242  
                                                                                                             
 235. See Martin & Yeates, supra note 115, at 820. 
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 240. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:192 (2000). 
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 242. See id. § 31:105 (explaining that the nature of an executive right 
includes the right to grant leases). A bonus is “money or other property given for 
the execution of a mineral lease.” Id. § 31:213(1). Rental means “money or other 
property given to maintain a mineral lease in the absence of drilling or mining 
operations or production of minerals.” Id. § 31:213(4).  
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B. Application to Quantum: Old Law Controls 
The Quantum court’s first mistake was in applying current 
succession law when classifying Allen’s usufruct, even though the 
decedent died in 1989––before the new law took effect.243 
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 870(B), the law in effect 
on the date of the decedent’s death governs succession rights.244 
This incorrect application is evidenced by the court’s citation to 
current article 890 instead of former article 890.245 Thus, the court 
should have looked to the law applicable in 1989 to properly 
analyze the case. 
The Quantum court should have applied the applicable law at 
the time of the decedent’s death, just as the court did in Morgan v. 
Leach.246 In Morgan, the decedent died in 1994 and bequeathed 
her entire estate in full ownership to her husband.247 Her children, 
who met the qualifications to be forced heirs, exercised their right to 
reduce the excessive disposition.248 The court in Morgan held that 
all usufructs established under former article 890 were “treated” as 
legal usufructs, and “unless there is an adverse testamentary 
disposition, the surviving spouse inherits, by operation of law, a 
usufruct of the estate to the extent permitted by Article 890.”249 The 
court noted that a bequest to a spouse of more than the law allows is 
not an adverse disposition and treated the excessive disposition as a 
confirmation of a legal usufruct.250 Ultimately, the Morgan court 
held that the surviving spouse was entitled to a legal usufruct under 
former article 890.251 
Just as in Morgan, the testatrix in Quantum died before the 
1996 revision;252 thus, the same law that the court used in Morgan 
should have been applied in Quantum. The testatrix in Quantum 
also bequeathed an excessive disposition to her husband in full 
                                                                                                             
 243. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 244. LA. CIV. CODE art. 870 (2015).  
 245. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 873. 
 246. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 247. Id. at 1382. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. at 1383 (citing Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. 
1975)). 
 250. See Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. 1975); Winsberg 
v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 48 (La. 1957); Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383. 
 251. Former article 890 encompassed legal and testamentary surviving 
spouse usufruct. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383. 
 252. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
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ownership, but she also had forced heirs.253 As in Morgan, the 
Quantum court should have applied former article 890. Under this 
reasoning, the excessive disposition in favor of Allen would not 
constitute an adverse testamentary disposition to an article 890 
usufruct.254 Thus, the proper classification for Allen’s usufruct 
under prior law was a legal surviving spouse usufruct.255  
In applying the incorrect law to the facts of Quantum, the court 
also misapplied Mineral Code article 190. The court held that 
Mineral Code article 190(B) did not apply to the case because, 
based on its classification of Allen’s usufruct, he was not a 
surviving spouse under article 190.256 It instead found that article 
190(A) was applicable to this case because the usufruct was 
classified as conventional.257 Thus, the Quantum court held that 
Allen was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the mineral rights 
because there was an open mine at the time the usufruct was 
created––mineral production began in 1996, and the usufruct was 
created in 1999.258  
However, under prior law, Allen should have received a 
usufruct that was “treated” as a legal surviving spouse usufruct 
even though it resulted from the testatrix’s will.259 Although the 
judgment of possession did not specifically state that the usufruct 
was that of a surviving spouse, the court should have applied 
article 190(B) because the usufruct was that of a surviving 
spouse.260 Under article 190(B), Allen, as a surviving spouse under 
the Mineral Code, should have been entitled to the use and 
enjoyment of the mineral rights regardless of the existence of open 
mines or the date of inception of the usufruct. This means that the 
dates the usufruct and drilling operations commenced were 
actually irrelevant. Thus, even though the court ultimately held that 
Allen was entitled to the mineral rights because the usufruct was 
created before there were open mines, the court applied the current 
law to reach that result, when it should have applied the pre-
revision law.  
                                                                                                             
 253. Id.  
 254. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 874. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id.  
 259. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383.  
 260. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(B) (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court’s analysis in Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil 
illustrates the importance of properly classifying a usufruct, 
specifically a usufruct that arises from a bequest in full ownership 
in favor of the surviving spouse that is reduced by the forced heirs. 
A case with facts similar to Quantum will come before Louisiana 
courts again, and large sums of money will be on the line. With the 
ongoing policy changes in Louisiana and the increasing demand 
for free testation, Louisiana courts must interpret wills in a way 
that furthers the testator’s intent. Allen Jones was lucky that 
drilling operations began before the judgment of possession, 
because, if not, he would have been deprived of money that was 
rightfully his. Future surviving spouses might not be so fortunate 
and might be deprived of their property if the Quantum analysis is 
followed. Instead, when there is a surviving spouse, courts must 
apply Mineral Code article 190(B), meaning that the surviving 
spouse will receive the mineral rights regardless of the open mine 
doctrine.  
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